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Summary findings
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requires a political, not economic or technical,  which requires an examination  of how the proposed
explanation. The evidence is consistent only with a class  reforms shift the relative powers of the stakeholders in
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directiy influenced by a desire for higher spending on  bureaucrats, and politicians.
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Introduction
There is broad consensus  that expansion  in the skills, knowledge,  and capacities  of
individuals  --increasing  human  capital-- is a key element in economic  progress and raising
living standards. Schooling  within formal education  systems  plays an important  role in the
expansion  of human  capital and governments  and international  fora have often made explicit
targets for the expansion  of schooling  in enrollment  or targets for expenditures. However,
there is a big difference  between children  sitting  in a classroom  and an increase  in human
capital.  The quality of education  is a deep concern in many developing  countries. On
internationally  comparable  tests some developing  countries, such as Korea and China, do quite
well, but others do abysmally 2. In some  countries  students' achievement  test scores after years
of instruction  are little better than random  guessing. If these quality deficiencies  were due
merely to the lack of inputs the policy  prescription  would  be obvious: increase  resources.
However, a cumulation  of empirical literature  using comparisons  of student  performance
across  countries, across  regions within countries, and across  schools  within regions
'  We would  like to thank Marlaine  Lockheed,  Emmanuel  Jimenez, Elizabeth  King, Harold
Alderman, Michael  Kremer, and Jonah Gelbach  for helpful comments  and discussion.
2 On the comparison  of reading performance  of 10 years olds, Venezuela  and Indonesia
were an amazing  6.5 standard  deviations  below the average  of the developed  countries.  On a
similar assessment  of science  performance  of 10 year olds, students  from Nigeria and the
Philippines  were 2.6 and 3.7 standard  deviations  below the developed  country mean.consistently  produces  the puzzling  and worrisome  finding  that resources  are only tenuously
related to measured  achievement.
In this paper we build on Hanushek's  (1995) argument  that since budget  differences  do
not account  for performance,  the incentives  that determine  how well the budget is spent  must
play an important  role.  We argue the evidence is grossly  inconsistent  with the assumption  that
resources are allocated  to maximize  educational  output (however  defined). The key indicator
of this misallocation  is that the cost effectiveness,  or achievement  gain per dollar, of teacher
related inputs is orders of magnitude  lower  than alternative  inputs. Relative overspending  on
inputs that are of direct concern to teachers  is so pervasive  that it is consistent  only with a
model of the allocation  of education  spending  in which teacher  welfare influences  spending,
over and above its impact  on school  quality.
When performance  is more a function of incentives  than of spending  the policy
implications  are less obvious. While in some cases  merely increasing  the budget is the
appropriate  educational  policy, it is increasingly  recognized  that in many other situations  more
fundamental  reforms that enhance  the importance  of outputs of education  in spending  decisions
are necessary  (Inter-American  Development  Bank, 1996).
We want to stress that although  we argue that the evidence is consistent  with enormous
inefficiencies  in education  spending  due to relatively  high spending  on teacher inputs, this
should not be construed  as an attack on teachers, who are the backbone  of any educational
system. But "government"  actions are neither deus ex machina  nor satanas ex machina, but
the result of the interaction  of differing  interests. Suggesting  that educators  defend their
interests is a methodological  assumption  common  to all economics,  not an ad hominem  attack.
2Just as there are "market  failures" intrinsic  to the incentives  of decentralized,  uncoordinated
exchange, there are "government  failures"  which are equally inherent  in the structure  of
incentives  created  by allocation  through  the political  process 3. The political  pressures  on the
allocation  of expenditures  across functional  categories  that we explore here for education  are
almost certainly  present in other sectors: health  clinics with personnel  but without  drugs or
needles, or highways  without maintenance  are depressingly  common.
T)  Theories of the allocation of expenditiures
This section  first explains why a behavioral  theory of expenditure  allocation  is
important  for understanding  the results of empirical  examinations  of the determinants  of
educational  outcomes. One such theory, an output maximizing  model is presented  along with
three variants: a simple  single educational  output, a model  with uncertainty,  and a model that
accommodates  multiple educational  outputs. We then introduce  an alternative  model of
expenditure  allocations  in which  both educational  outputs and teacher  welfare enter directly
into the determination  of spending.
A) Why it takes a theory
3  Although  it should  be pointed  out this trend in considering  market and govermnent
failures is a renewed, not new, interest for economists:
It is not sufficient  to contrast  the imperfect  adjustments  of unfettered  private enterprise
with the best adjustment  economists  in their studies  can imagine. For, we cannot
expect that any State authority will attain, or will even whole heartedly  seek, that ideal.
Such authorities  are liable alike to ignorance,  to sectional  pressures, and to personal
corruption by private interest (Pigou, 1912).
3Production  possibilities  are determined  by an underlying  technological  process. The
maximum  amount of output possible  for an amount  of inputs  given the constraints  imposed  by
the underlying  technical  process is the "production  function." The relationship  between  plant
growth and water or sunlight  or fertilizer  is determined  by a biological  process, the
relationship  between coal burned and heat produced  is determined  by a physical process.
Similarly, applying  the metaphor  to education  one can talk of the educational  "production
function"  which is determined  by an underlying  pedagogical  process.
Even though the production  function is derived from technical, not behavioral
relationships,  one needs a behavioral  theory to understand  the results of estimating  a
production function for two reasons. First, the increment  to output from additional  inputs is
not constant. The second algebra book per student  will likely help less than the first, and the
tenth much less (perhaps  even have a negative  impact). The contribution  to output of an input
depends  on the rate of input  utilization  at which it is assessed. Nearly all education  production
function studies are not experiments  in which  input use is chosen by a researcher,  but rather
use data drawn from reality. In reality, the spending  on inputs (e.g. teacher wages, class
sizes, buildings, textbook  use) is chosen  for reasons other than research and since input use is
chosen, the theory of the input choice  predicts the observed input productivity  and guides the
interpretation  of results.
This is particular important  in educational  research, as there is a crucial distinction
between testing whether inputs  have low productivity  at their current rate of application  versus
testing whether they are "inputs"  at all.  One could study the effect of either fertilizer or
Mozart piano concertos  on corn production.  Even though at sufficiently  high rates of
4application  the size of fertilizer's impact  could be small (or even negative),  fertilizer is clearly
an input, and the only question  is the magnitude  of the impact.  On the other hand, Mozart's
music, while delightful,  might not be an input into corn production,  in the sense that it has
zero corn production impact across  all soil conditions,  concerti, and volumes.
Teachers, classrooms, and instructional  materials  are clearly inputs into education. If
one understands  the statistical  tests of whether  the effect of class sizes or teacher wages  are
different from zero as tests of whether  these inputs ever  matter (as with Mozart music)  the
whole endeavor  appears  silly and pointless (which in fact has often been the reaction of the
education  community  to this line of empirical  research). However, as the model described
above suggests, a failure to reject zero marginal  product of higher teacher  wages or reduced
class sizes may simply  mean that the rate of application  is so high that the marginal  product at
the chosen rate of application  conditional  on other inputs is (statistically)  indistinguishable
from zero.
Second, as discussed  in section  III, the policy implications  of empirical  findings depend
critically  on the theory behind  the data.  If the input use is the result of some endogenous
political  process, changes  in input use may not be feasible  without  changes in the underlying
process that determines  budgets. Simple  statements  like "spend  more on input x" are not
necessarily  valuable  contributions  to policy  making when policies  are politically  determined.
R) A plaugible  (at leaqt to economists) theory, with variations
Variation 1:  Simple output maximizing.  How would someone fully informed about the
production function allocate  spending  of a fixed budget across  inputs to maximize  output (or,
5equivalently,  allocate inputs in order to minimize the input costs of a specified level of
output)?  If educational output is denoted by S and is related to educational inputs (e.g. books,
teachers,  desks) denoted as elements xi of a vector X, each of which has a price pi, according
to a technically determined production functionf  s, then the maximization problem subject to a
fixed money budget B is:
Maximize S  = fs  (X)
s.t.  p'X=B
The assumption that inputs are allocated in this optimizing fashion creates very strong
predictions about the results of estimating educational production functions.  Whatever the
budget, inputs should be allocated such that the marginal product per dollar (MPPD) is
equalized across all used inputs.  That is, the first order conditions are4:
'  fS  =  0, V  ij  (1)
Pi  pi
-which  means that the ratio of the marginal products in the production function should be
exactly the same as the ratio of the prices, or the increment to educational output per dollar, or
technical cost effectiveness spent, should be exactly the same for each input5.
4  These are the conditions for an interior maximum involving some use of inputs i and j,
5 This is of course the old (and by now obvious) condition for economic efficiency in any
endeavor. As Frank Knight pointed out in 1921 "In the utilization of limited resources...  we
tend to apportion our resources among the alternative uses that are open in such a way that
equal amounts of resource yield equivalent returns in all fields."
6Two objections  to this simple  model can be incorporated  as more or less minor
variations of the optimizing  model: first, that those allocating  inputs are not fully informed  and
second, that schooling  cannot be characterized  as a single  output.
Variation  2: Optimizing  with uncertainty Some  might claim that the person allocating
the inputs is trying to maximize  the test score increment  from spending  a fixed budget but the
'true" educational  production function is a very complex  thing about which the chooser  knows
very little.  That the educational  production  function is complex  is almost certainly  true as the
underlying  pedagogical  relationships,  like any relationships  that involve  purposive human
behavior, are enormously  complicated. The exact  processes  and procedures  followed inside
the classroom, including  almost  intrinsically  unobservable  factors  such as the match of the
personality  of the teacher  and the student, certainly  matter for educational  outcomes  in ways
that will be impossible  for any large sample  empirical  research to capture. Moreover, there
are bound to be interactions  between  various inputs which will be very difficult to empirically
specify.
However, no matter how complex  the true function, the situation  can be formally
characterized  by assuming  the person making  the allocation  decision  believes  that on average
the true relationship  is some production  function,  g.  Therefore,  the optimizing  allocation  will
be such that:
s  s
1_  zQgj  0  V ij  (2)
Pi pi
7that is, the person  deciding  on the allocation  believes  he or she is equalizing  the marginal  products
per dollar in the production  function.
Variation  3: Optimizing  with multiple  outputs A second objection  is that many would
allege that researchers  are missing  a large part of what schools  are all about with their narrow
minded obsession  with test scores 6. In every society  schools  are meant to transmit  more than
information:  they also transmit  expected  and acceptable  patterns of social interaction  and
cultural norms and beliefs (Piccioto, 1996).  Moreover,  parents, children and society at large
care about many more features  of a school  than  just the improvement  they provide  to test
scores: the pleasantness  of the environment  in general (e.g. personal  safety), non-academic
cultural  opportunities  (e.g. music), non-academic  recreational  opportunities  (e.g. sports),
equalization  of outcomes  across  students  with different  innate  abilities (e.g. remedial  education
spending).
However, in spite of the complexity,  this situation  can also be formally characterized  as
a variation on the optimizing  model. Suppose  that the objective  function involves  two outputs:
test scores, S, and some measure  of non-academic  output, C (C for "Citizenship"  or "Culture"
or "not being a Criminal"). In this case the optimizing  problem is to maximize  the total value
of all school output subject  to the production  function for each of the outputs and the budget
constraint  (expanding  this set-up to include  more than two outputs or to allow a non-linear
6  Since most researchers  have been selected  (self or otherwise)  to be researchers  at least to
some extent on the basis on their performance  on test scores  during their academic  career this
obsession  is perhaps understandable.
8objective  function would also be straightforward). That is, inputs  will be allocated  in order to
maximize  the value of:
S(X)  + P,C(X)
subject  to the production  functions  for S and C:
S  =fs  (Xs  Xc  )
C  = hc  (Xs,  Xc)
and the budget constraint.
The first order conditions  for an interior maximum  in this case imply that the marginal
product of each input in the production  of each output ("scores"  and "citizenship")  will not be
equalized. The way these vary will depend  on both the relative value placed on the two
outputs (pa)  as well as the relative marginal  products and prices of the various inputs.
fi  S  fi  = pC*[  - _  ]3)
Pi  Pi  P  Pi
This model implies  the marginal product  per dollar in producing  scores  at the optimum  will be
different  if the marginal products  of inputs in producing  scores  and "citizenship"  is different.
If one input is relatively  more productive  in the production  of "citizenship"  then its input use
will be higher (and hence marginal product  per dollar in scores  production lower) than if one
were optimizing  over scores  alone.
While this has been presented  as a normative  model, what a person should  do if in fact
they wanted  to optimize, the simplest  behavioral  model of the allocation  of spending  is to
9assume the normative  model is the  positive model. That is, just assume that the chooser
actually  behaves as if he/she were optimizing. While this assumption  is heroic, it is implicit
(and sometimes  explicit) in nearly all educational  production  function  research 7.
C) A new positive model of expenditure allocations
Very few people would  accept the optimizing  model  as a complete  or accurate
description  and in fact the production  finction has had very little empirical success  in
explaining  school performance. However, since  the intuitive  foundations  are so clean and
attractive  the difficulty  in rejecting the optimizing  model is proposing  a specific, concrete,
alternative  against  which to judge it.  Therefore, before turning to the empirical evidence  we
propose a very simple  alternative  model, which embeds  the optimizing  models as a special
case.
Suppose  the person allocating  inputs accepts  a certain  budget as fixed and maximizes  a
weighted  average  of the utility of school output  S(X) and teacher's utilities T(X)  (expressed  in
units of test scores). The implied  objective  function is:
C(X)  = (I-a)*S(X)  + a*(X)
7  To estimate and interpret  the cost function as the dual of the production function  requires
the assumption  of maximization  (Jimenez, 1986, Jimenez  and Paqueo, 1996, James, King and
Suryadi, 1996).
10where a, the weight given to teacher  utility, lies between 0 and 1.  In this set-up  the outcome
depends  not only on the underlying  production  function  determined  by the pedagogical  process
but also on the structure  of the teacher's utility function 8.
The simplest  way to formalize  this is to think of the teacher's utility as the sum of two
components:  the utility derived directly  from spending  on educational  inputs and that derived
from greater educational  output. The teacher  utility derived directly  from educational  spending
depends  on how the spending  on those inputs  effects their own welfare independently  of its
effect on scores.  For instance,  higher teacher  wages raise direct teacher  utility dollar for
dollar, while spending  on physical amenities  within the school (like larger classrooms)  or
spending  on reducing  workload (like smaller classes)  would raise teacher welfare, but not by
the equivalent  of an unrestricted  dollar given to the teacher, and spending  on items like books
or desks for students  would  have zero (or near zero) impact  on direct utility.  Teacher  utility
also depends, through  altruism  or professionalism,  directly on educational  output. The total
teacher  utility function is:
T(X) = (1-6)*U(Y'X)  + (8)*S(X)
where UO is the direct utility derived from inputs, y is a vector which gives a weight to each
of the inputs (weights  which lie between  0 and 1).  The individual  yi's for each input are the
relative prices, in that they are the teacher's willingness  to pay for an additional  dollar of
8  This is not referring to the direct effect teacher  morale or satisfaction  or compensation
might have on output, as this is already embedded  into the production  function (so far have
said nothing about the structure  of the production  function).
11spending  on input i relative to their willingness  to pay for a dollar of salary and hence are pure
numbers. The "professionalism"  parameter, 8, also lies between  0 and 1.
Now the optimization  problem in allocating  spending  to raise this weighted  average  of
teacher  utility and test scores  is:
Maximize [ (I-a)  + a*8  ]*fs(X)  + a*(l-6)  *U(y'X)
s.t. p'X  = B
While this model is in many ways a modest  generalization  of the previous  model, it has very
different predictions  about the allocation  of expenditures.  In particular, the ratios of the
marginal educational  output per dollar of input  will not be equalized  across inputs. Instead of
implying  the difference  in marginal utility per dollar of inputs will be zero, as in the simple
optimizing  model, the first order conditions  of this model imply:
J,  I_ -s=  a(l-8)  * U*  [j  - ']  (4)
Pi pj  (l-a)  + ab  pi  pi
That is, as long as the weight  given to teacher  utility is not exactly  zero (a >-o)  and the degree
of professionalism  of teachers is not sufficiently  high that they are completely  selfless (6 < 1)
then marginal products  per dollar will not be equalized. The more directly an input enters
teacher  utility (a higher y 1) the lower the marginal  product per dollar of that input in producing
education  will be, relative  to another  input at the optimum.
12The intuition  is clear: since  the chooser of inputs cares directly about teacher  utility this
will lead to a higher level of spending  on inputs that teachers  care about and because marginal
products are declining  this higher level of utilization  will lead to a lower marginal  product per
dollar of that input.  Conversely,  those inputs that do not enter directly into teacher's utility
will have higher marginal product  per dollar because their level of use will be lower than
under pure optimizing. In this model, the marginal product  per dollar of inputs  that teachers
value directly (e.g. wages) will be smaller  than the marginal product  per dollar of inputs which
teachers  value indirectly  (e.g. smaller class sizes, better physical facilities)  which, in turn, will
be smaller than those  that teachers  value only because of their effect on achievement  (e.g.
books).
Figure  1:  Score  versus  other  objective  maximizing,
implicationsfior  marginal  products  per  dollar  of  inputs
Books  (5)  E  U-U
E  R'
. .....  . .+  .
MP/$  __  ers
APAS~~~~~~~S
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13Figure 1 illustrates  the case with only two hypothetical  inputs, call them "books"  and
"wages."  The educational  output optimizing  choice  would be to choose point A, where the
educational  output isoquant 9, whose slope  is the relative  marginal product of books to teachers,
is tangent to the budget  line, whose slope is the relative price of books to teachers.  At this
point the conditions  for an (interior)  maximum  are reached.
Adding teacher's utility directly  to the chooser's objectives  implies that the isoquants  of
this new objective  function are steeper  than those of the educational  output only isoquant. This
implies the new equilibrium  for a given budget  will involve  more teacher and less book
spending  (point B).  This higher level of spending  reduces  the marginal product  per dollar of
teachers  (illustrated  in the southeast  quadrant)  and increases  the marginal  product per dollar of
books (illustrated  in the northwest  quadrant), which were equal when the objective  function
included  only achievement. When teacher's utility is added to the objective  function,
relatively  less is spent on "books"  and relatively  more is spent on "wages"  so that the marginal
product  per dollar of "books"  is high relative to the marginal product per dollar of "wages."
Before  moving to the evidence,  let us make two points.  First, our alternative  model
is not derived from first principles. At this stage  we do not propose a particular  reason why
teacher  utility is present in the objective  function: it could be the result of patronage
maximization  of politicians,  it could be the result of budget  maximizing  bureacrats.
Therefore "a" is our alternative  model  does not necessarily  represent  "teacher  power"  or the
benefits to individual  teachers, but rather represents  a possible outcome  from a broad class of
I The combinations  of books and teachers  that produce  constant  amounts  of educational
output.
14models from which could this weight on teacher inputs could be be derived.  We return to this
point in Section III below when we discuss policy.
In particular,  we are not arguing that teachers are individually overpaid,  a point we
return to in the final section'".  Nor are we arguing "too much" is spent on education as we do
not model the determination of the overall budget for education, which could be low.  In many
cases spending on teachers (or the budget overall) is "too low" in any absolute sense, even if
teacher spending is "too high" relative to the productivity of other inputs.
IT)  Our reading of the evidence
How do the predictions of the two classes of models, output maximizing and teacher
influence, fare when faced with the evidence?  There is an enormous literature examining the
relationship between the level and composition of educational spending and the output of the
educational process".  We review three types of evidence in the literature: studies of cost
effectiveness, education production function estimates, and direct evidence from differences in
10 Several recent papers have examined whether teachers are "overpaid" by comparing
wages or incomes of teachers either with cross-national norms (Cox-Edwards,  1989,  Carnoy
and Welmond,  1996) or with wages of other individuals, controlling for individual
characteristics, like age and education (e.g Psacharopoulos,  1987).  To see why this literature
is distinct, imagine that receiving a teaching position was like a sinecure, for which the teacher
received a fixed annual payment completely independent of performance, and imagine that
therefore teachers did no teaching at all.  In this hypothetical case the "wages" of teachers
could be arbitrarily low and yet the ratio of marginal product of teacher to non-teacher
expenditures still be quite high.
11 Much of this literature relevant to developing countries has been done at, or for,  the
World Bank (Lockheed and Hanushek,  1988, Hanushek,  1995, Harbison and Hanushek,  1992,
Glewwe,  1996, Hanushek and Lavy, 1994, Khandker, Lavy, and Filmer,  1994, Tan, Lane and
Coustere,  1996, World Bank,  1995).
15parental control within educational systems.  Together this evidence overwhelmingly rejects all
three variants of the educational output optimizing models (simple, uncertainty, and multiple
output) in favor of a model which incorporates teacher utility into decision making.  To
preview the results, the failure of the equalization of marginal product per dollar rejects simple
optimizing.  The systematic pattern of that rejection across inputs: that educator related inputs
tend to be overused relative to non-teaching outputs, rejects the uncertainty (and we believe,
multiple output) models.  The comparisons between public and private schools, or schools with
more or iess parental control, or comparisons of outcomes with different teacher unions,
definitively reject all three educational output optimizing models.
A) Fmpirical estimates of the cost effectiveness of various inputs
The key hypothesis to test the simple optimizing versus our model is whether the
marginal products per dollar of all educational inputs are equalized.  However,  studies only
rarely go on from estimating the marginal products in physical terms (e.g.  the effect of class
size on test scores) to calculating the educational gain per dollar spent, typically called "cost
effectiveness", which is the best guess at the marginal product per dollar of spending of
different inputs at the observed allocations 12
Table 1 reports the cost effectiveness estimates derived from a large scale evaluation of
an education project in Northeast Brazil (Harbison and Hanushek, 1992).  These estimates line
up exactly as we would have expected if there is a substantial amount of teacher influence.
12 Unfortunately,  it is impossible to recover comparisons of the marginal versus average
distinction from the existing empirical literature.
16The cost effectiveness of teacher salaries (normalized to 1) is by far the lowest.  Material
inputs which provide amenities to the school and teachers, such as teacher tables, toilets,
bookcases,  have a cost effectiveness on average 7.7 times larger than teacher salaries.
Instructional materials, which provide benefits to teachers only insofar as they increase scores,
have cost effectiveness ratios between 17 and 34 times as large as the impact of additional
spending on teacher salary increases.  The prediction of the simple optimizing model, that cost
effectiveness is equalized, is wrong by at least an order of magnitude.
Table 1:  Ratio  of test score  gain  per dollar  in Portuguese  and Mathematics  for various  inputs
relative  to teacher  salary  (= 1), average estimates  from Northeast Brazil
Second grade (Average  Fourth grade (Average
Grand average  1981,83,85)  1983,85)
(years, subjects,  1981,83_85_19838  ,5i
grades)  Portuguese  I  Mathematics  Portuguese  I Mathematics
Material inputs
______  Textbook usage  17.7  33.9  22.7  14.5  0.0
Writing materials  34.9  11.8  13.8  58.8  55.3
Software*  19.4  19.4  13.4  24.5  20.3
Infrastructure inputs
lHardware*  [  7.7  1  3.4  ]  3.5  J  16.0  |  8.1
Alternative teacher education strategies
Curso de Qualificacao  5.0  1.2  2.5  5.0  11.3
Logos  8.3  8.3  6.8  13.5  4.6
4 years  primary  school  6.7  8.5  13.2  0.0  5.3
13  years secondary school  1.9  2.5  3.9  0.0  1.5
Teacher salary
Teacher salary  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0
* Hardware: water, bookcase, teacher table, pupil chair, pupil desk, two classrooms, large room, director's room,
kitchen, toilet, store cupboard Software: writing material, chalk, notebook, pencil, eraser, crayons, textbook usage
Source: Derived from Harbison and Hanushek (1992), Table 6-2
Table 2 provides similar estimates from a large scale study of student achievement in
eight states in India (World Bank, 1996a).  The cost effectiveness of increasing teacher salaries
is again normalized to 1.  The cost effectiveness of spending on improving physical facilities is
17higher than that of teacher salaries (1.2 times higher), however that for increasing just
classroom size is between 1.7 and 4 times higher.  The cost effectiveness of spending on
instructional inputs is between 4 and 14 times higher than that of increasing teacher salaries.
Again the actual ratio between the marginal product per dollar of salary inputs and
instructional materials is different from the level predicted by optimizing model by more than
an order of magnitude,  14 to 1.
Table 2:  Test score  gain per rupee  for various  inputs  relative  to teacher  salary (=1), average
across  low-literacy  districts  in eight  states  of India, 1993
Instructional  materials
_  Complete  package  of instructional  materials  and aids  14.0
Coverage  under Operation  Blackboard,  equipment  only  4.0
Physical  facilities
I  - Full package  of facilities  _  1.2
One additional  square foot per student
Cost  based on school  construction  in Uttar  Pradesh  4.3
,Cost  based on DPEP average  1.7
Teacher  Quality
fIncreasing  average  teacher  salary  by Rs. 100  per month  per school  1.0
Opportunity  to learn
Reducing  the pupil  teacher  ratio by one  0.1
Adding  one additional  school  day per academic  year  1.0
Adding  one additional  teaching  hour per  academic  year  0.6
Adding  one additional  hour of language  instruction  per academic  week  29.0
Source:  World  Bank  (1996a)  Annex  F
What is somewhat puzzling is that class size reductions are even less effective than
teacher salaries.  However both of these results are consistent with recent estimates by
Kingdon (1996) using sample survey data for students from 30 schools in urban Uttar Pradesh,
who finds that if the cost effectiveness of teacher salary is normalized to 1, the cost
18effectiveness  of class size reductions  is .029 but the cost effectiveness  of increasing  school
physical resources is 3.2's.
R) Fducation  production  function.estimates
Do these few cost effectiveness  studies  represent  the typical  case across  a variety of
conditions? While there are few studies  that calculate  cost effectiveness  for different types  of
inputs, there are numerous  studies which  relate student  achievement  to school characteristics,
such as inputs, while controlling  for student's background  characteristics  (e.g. parental
income, education)  and there have been several  prominent  reviews  of this literature. These
reviews  face enormous  difficulties  in summarizing  the empirical  results of the different studies
as the estimated  coefficients,  which are reported in physical  quantity  units, (e.g. test scores
gain per square foot) are not directly comparable  either across  inputs or across studies.
Therefore the reviews  summarize  only whether the effect was estimated  to be positive or
negative and whether it was statistically  significant  (although  some do attempt  to report "effect
sizes"  which, at least normalizes  the test scores  to standard  deviation, Lockheed  and Haunshek
1988).
Confirmation  percentage  evidence. Holding  these problems  firmly in mind, there are
two ways we can bring the enormous  educational  production  function literature  to bear on our
competing  positive models. First, we can compare  the "confirmation  percentage"  of various
inputs, that is the frequency  with which  the variable is found to be statistically  significant  of
13  Since this study did not report cost data for school resources, we used data from World
Bank (1996a)  to calculate  these ratios.
19the expected sign sorted by our conjectures  as to which inputs are of most and which of least
direct importance  to teachers 1'  5. In the most recent of these compendia,  Fuller and Clarke
(1994)  summarized  in Table 3, there is a markedly  higher confirmation  ratio for the inputs,
like facilities and instrumental  materials, which are less likely  to appear  directly in teacher's
utility (two other reviews, Harbison  and Hanushek, 1992 and Velez, Schiefelbein  and
Valenzuela, 1993 report similar results and are included  as appendix  1).
In Table 3 "teacher's salary" has a confirmation  rate of 36 percent for primary and 18
percent for secondary  schools, the confirmation  rates of teacher-pupil  ratio are 35 and 9
percent respectively. In contrast, the presence  of a school  library has a confirmation  rate of 89
percent and the availability  of textbooks  a confirmation  rate of 73 percent for primary and 54
percent for secondary  schools. Interestingly,  a review  of 43 studies  (appendix  table A.2)
found that only 4 of those found a significant  and positive relationship  between "teacher
satisfaction"  and student  achievement.
14  We include only inputs reported in the surveys  of the literature that were subject  to 10
or more studies.
"  This ranking is problematic  as the interpretation  of a coefficient  depends  critically the
other variables included  in the regression. For instance, some  regressions  include
"instructional  time," if teacher salaries  are included  in the same  regression  then more time for
the same salary would be a real wage  reduction  which teachers  should oppose  so that the
marginal  product should  be very high.  If teacher salaries  are not included  then its sign is
ambiguous. Similarly,  the coefficients  on "teacher  training"  or "teacher  education"  all depend
on what else is included  in the regression.
20Table  3:  Confirmation  percentages  of various  educational  inputs  sorted  by direct importance
to teacher utility.
1  Positive  and  Confirmation
|  Number of studies  significant relation  Percentage
Primary Schools:  ._.
Teacher's salary  level  11  4  36.4
School  teacher  pupil  ratio  26  9  34.6
Teacher's years of schooling  18  9  50.0
Teacher's  experience  23  13  56.5
Class instructional  time  17  15  88.2
Class frequency  of homework  11  9  81.8
School  library  18  16  88.9
School  textbooks  26  19  73.1
Secondary schools
Teacher's  salary level  11  2  18.2
School  teacher  pupil  ratio  22  2  9.1
Teacher's  experience  12  1  8.3
Class instructional  time  16  12  75.0
School  textbooks  13  7  53.8
,Source:  Fuller and Clarke (1994)
If marginal product per dollar were equalized, there is no compelling reason to believe
that the confirmation ratios would not have been roughly equal across inputs. While this
evidence is far from airtight, as it is possible the differences in precision could have affected
the pattern of statistical significance, the most straightforward way to read this evidence is that
studies that use non-experimental data systematically evaluate the marginal product of inputs at
points that are not education output maximizing. The results suggest that at the input spending
allocations typically observed in non-experimental data in which these allocations are the result
of choice, the marginal product of inputs is lower for those inputs more highly valued by
teachers and hence they are more likely to be statistically insignificant.
21The second way these production function  studies could be brought to bear on the
competing  hypothesis  is to calculate  estimates  of the marginal  product per dollar from the
results. Unfortunately,  after scouring  this literature  we found very few studies  that report the
necessary  information,  principally  because  they lack data on the relative  costs of various
inputs. Even among  those that do report some estimates  of cost effectiveness,  standard
practice is to calculate  cost effectiveness  only for those estimates  that happen to be statistically
significant  (and in the right direction).  Table 4 reports the educational  production function
estimates  by Tan, Lane, and Coustemane  (1996)  for which they calculate  cost effectiveness
only for those few inputs, particularly  workbooks  and furniture, that were statistically
significant. They do not however compare  cost effectiveness  per dollar with other inputs, such
as reductions  in class size.  Using their estimates  and information  about teacher salaries and
class sizes from other sources  we calculate  that at the estimates  they report, providing
workbooks  was 800 to 1600 times, and providing  furniture  700 to 1200  times, more cost
effective  than reducing  class sizes. One might object we are using a statistically  insignificant,
and hence potentially  imprecise,  estimate on class size, but even if we add two standard
deviations  to the point estimate  for class size (that is increase  it to the upper range of a 95
percent confidence  interval)  the impact  of workbooks  or furniture  was 100  times larger than of
reducing  class size. This is still two orders of magnitude  larger than the ratio predicted  by an
optimizing  model.
22Table 4:  Calculating relative cost effectiveness  of teacher to non-teacher inputs
while  taking  precision  of estimation  into account.
Input:  Subject:  Ratio  of cost effectiveness  of inputs  to increasing  class
size:
At point  estimates  of all  Adding  two std. dev. to class
variables  size point  estimate
Math  689  90
Furniture
Filipino  1243  113
Math  842  110
Workbooks
Filipino  1592  145
Notes: In order to calculate  the cost of decreasing  class size, we use the fact that average
teacher  salary is 2.5 times  GNP per capita  (World  Bank, 1996b)  and assume  that each
teacher  teaches  an average of two classes,  and that the average  class size is 40.19 as
reported  in Tan and others  (1996).
Since  most  investigators  begin  with  a presumption  that the  inputs  into education  are
reasonably  well  known,  presumably  the  key critical  question  that estimation  of a production
function  could  help  resolve  is whether  reallocating  inputs  given  a fixed  budget  could  improve
performance.  Reporting  only  estimates  of the production  'unction  with  no  estimates  of costs  is
not even  relevant  to that  question.  The  distressingly  common  practice  of reporting  the
production  function  estimates  of known  educational  inputs  in quantity  units  (e.g.  class  size)
text  books,  physical  facilities  and  their  statistical  significance  without  comparative  information
on  costs  is nearly  devoid  of policy  interest"6.
16  By  stipulating  known  inputs  we distinguish  studies  of pedagogical  innovations  such as
radio  instruction,  computer  assisted  learning,  alternative  teaching  strategies,  etc.,  where  the
question  of zero  marginal  product  over  all  ranges  is actually  a useful  null hypothesis.
23This also raises a problem for the "meta-analysis"  approach  to creating statistical
significance,  in that it ignores the actual underlying  policy question  and the asymmetry  in what
the two sides of the "money  matters"  debate are asserting. That is, if the impact of teacher
inputs (e.g. salaries, class size) is not demonstrably  different from zero then it is also not
optimal, in the sense of equalized  marginal products. However, showing  only that teacher
inputs, or budgetary  inputs generally,  have some impact  (which can be done with meta-
analysis  Hedges, Laine and Greenwald, 1994) does not address  the question  of whether those
levels of inputs are optimal  or whether reallocations  in expenditures  could increase  output.
Moreover, calculating cost effectiveness for only those estimates that are statistically
significant  confuses  the magnitude  with the precision  of the estimate" 7.
One intriguing  aspect of using a normative  optimizing  production  function model as a
positive descriptive  model  of behavior  in an empirical  study is that these assumptions  self-
referentially  predict the impact  of the study itself.  If educational  policy makers are assumed  to
be attempting  to optimize, then choosing  too much teacher  expenditure  relative to spending  on
physical facility, equipment  or books could only have been because  of a mistaken  belief about
the "true"  production function. But then the behavioral  model  predicts that the study itself (if
believed)  should  cause a reallocation  of resources towards  the more productive  resources  as the
17  One huge problem with reporting  only signs and statistical  significance  concerns
statistical  power.  Failing to reject that a particular  coefficient  is zero could result either
because  the estimated  impact was small or because  the impact  was large, but very imprecisely
estimated. If the effect of some inputs  is estimated  with greater precision  then these will tend
to be more "significant"  even if they are empirically  smaller. Moreover, there is no necessary
connection  between the precision  of the estimates  in quantity  units and cost per unit so one
may "fail to reject" the test of zero impact  for some inputs  which have extremely high cost
effectiveness  while finding  statistically  "significant"  other inputs with low cost effectiveness.
24new information  fixes the previous mistake. Has this (implicit)  prediction  of output
maximizing  models  been confirmed?
As we presented  in the section  above, the weight  of international  evidence  of too little
spending  on some inputs has always been impressive,  and has been accumulating  over time.
Fuller and Clarke, in their 1994 review, point out that while there were 37 new studies since
the review of the evidence in 1986  (Fuller, 1986), the new studies  mostly confirmed  previous
patterns, particularly  the relatively  greater importance  of books and instructional  materials  than
class size and teacher  inputs (Fuller and Clarke 1994). However, while recent data are very
difficult to come by, the share of educational  expenditures  devoted has, if anything, shifted
towards an even greater share of teacher  compensation  (although  this may be due to a fiscal
contraction.) We know of none, and conjecture  it would  be difficult  to document a single
instance  in which an empirical study, or even a series of studies,  actually affected  the
distribution  of expenditures 18. In contrast, a model that explains the existing spending
allocation as the result of a political  process implies that studies  of the products of various
inputs may, but probably will not, influence  spending  which will require changing  the
incentives  of decision  makers (summarized  as "a" in our simple  set-up).
18  There raises another, borderline  ironic, sub-text  to the econometric  production function
estimates. In order for the estimates  from non-experimental  data to correctly identify  an
underlying  production function  there needs to be some  mechanism  that causes different  choices
of input mix other than shifts in the production  function itself. If differences  in input use
across the levels of the data (e.g. districts, schools, etc.) are due to differences  in teacher's
utility weight (a) in the objective  function across  policy makers  then this implies  the empirical
estimates  are correctly identifying  the production  function. However, while these makes the
estimates  technically  correct it also makes them irrelevant  for policy.
25Caveats  about the educational  production  function literature. We should not overstate
our case as to the reliability  of the educational  production  function literature in supporting  any
hypothesis. Many of the studies find nothing  to be statistically  significant  and often find
perverse patterns in the point estimates  (for example  negative  signs on inputs like teachers or
books). Moreover, even when the estimates  of the individual  production function  coefficients
are reasonable,  school inputs typically  have very small explanatory  power.  There are several
additional  econometric  difficulties  with the literature  and we should  at least mention four:
simplistic  and differing  specifications' 9, multi-collinearity,  insufficient  variation in input use,
and different sensitivities  among  inputs.
One point on the latter two concerns. Suppose  that there were a number of potential
non-teaching  inputs with high, but steeply  declining  marginal  products (like algebra books).  A
perfectly random allocation  of resources among  these  non-teaching  inputs would produce a
pattern of some very large and some small estimated  marginal  products  with the high
productivity  of some of these factors due to the very low utilization. Different inputs might
have different amounts  of variation in use 20. This pattern suggests  that there are inputs for
'9  The specifications  in this literature  use quite simple  assumptions  about the production
function,  usually that output is linear or log-linear  in inputs. In particular this rules out
interactive  effects between inputs  which are potentially  important.  Also, the analyses  reported
above may suffer from the fact that the specifications  are not identical  across  the various
results reported.  Even so, World Bank  (1996a)  reports results from estimating  the exact same
functional  form of an educational  production  function in low literacy districts in eight Indian
states, for two different educational  outcomes. The results clearly show  that the significance
(and sign) of the effects of the inputs vary widely  across the different  states even for exactly
the same specification.
20  Using the results of World Bank (1996a)  we perform a crude regression  of the
significance  of the parameter  estimate on the mean and standard  deviation  of the input.  The
26which the marginal product is very high at low levels but declines  very rapidly. In this case
one would  expect to see a very high marginal product  for that input, but also observe  that the
input was rarely in range of low use, and hence the empirical  finding is of limited usefulness.
For instance, Glewwe  (1996) conducts  a study of the determinants  of school quality in Ghana
using a large scale data set and the only statistically  significant  school  level effects on math and
reading test scores are from the fraction  of classrooms  that have blackboards,  and the fraction
of classrooms  that cannot  be used when it rains. However, even in Ghana, 90 percent of
schools  have blackboards  and only 15 percent of middle schools have leaking classrooms.
) Direct evidence
The 10 to 100 fold divergences  in marginal  product per dollar across inputs, and that
these are in a consistent  pattern across  inputs, rule out both the simple  and uncertainty
optimizing  models. However, one could still return to the multiple output model and
conjecture  that the observed  pattern of marginal  products in producing  scores corresponds  to
the inverse  pattern in the marginal  products in producing  some other output. In this section we
first say why we think this objection  is unfounded,  and then show  additional  evidence  that
bears directly on the difference  between  the multiple schooling  output and our model, and
which leans in favor of a positive model  with teacher influence.
results suggest  that for score on reading  test the degree  of significance  of the effect of an input
is significantly  negatively  related  to the mean value of the input. For the score on the math
test, the estimated  magnitude  of the effect is significantly  positively  related  to its standard
deviation.
27There are three reasons  the multiple  output model is theoretically  and empirically
inadequate. First, it appeals  to variables  that are either unobserved  or unobservable,  which
makes the model non-falsifiable. Someone  with an interest in rejecting a positive model of
expenditures  with teacher influence  could always assert that the patterns of the marginal
product of inputs for the unobserved  component  of educational  output (e.g. citizenship)  are
exactly  what they would have to be in order to rationalize  the observed  outcomes. Because the
output is unobservable  they could make this assertion  without fear of contradiction  (or
confirmation). Second,  related to the first, there is little or no empirical  evidence  of the effect
of various educational  inputs  on anything  other than achievement 21. Third, it is hard to
understand  intuitively  how a multiple output model  could explain  the existing empirical
patterns, for instance  of teacher  salary versus class size or physical facilities  versus
instructional  materials. In order for an appeal  to multiple outputs to be satisfying,  one would
have to explain why is it that the unobservable  output of education  requires enormously  higher
teacher  salaries, more teachers, but less physical  facilities  and less instructional  materials than
the observable  output.
Parental  versus educator  power: Local and  parental contributions,  private schools and
unions. Fortunately, there is a source of direct evidence  which is able to distinguish  the
21  Card and Krueger in various  papers (e.g. Card and Krueger, 1996) have shown that
budgets are related  to subsequent  wages  of workers, but this evidence is not entirely relevant,
for two reasons. First, their studies  are of aggregate  budgets  and do not address the question
of relative marginal  products of various inputs. Second, their studies are consistent  with
wages  being a better measure of achievement  than multiple  choice tests without invoking any
additional  assumptions  that something  besides achievement  (e.g. "worker  docility")  being
produced  by schooling.
28multiple output from the teacher influence  models. As pointed out above, if the chooser is
attempting  to optimize  then new information  about the production  function should  change
inputs and outcomes. In this section  we argue that the converse is also true: if the optimizing
model were really correct then one should  not see patterns of input use and outcomes  respond
to different degrees  of incentives. Greater local financing  or control of schools, differing
degrees of competition,  or differing  amounts  of union power should not affect technical
efficiency. But the evidence  suggests  that these factors  do have an important  effect both on the
allocation  of expenditures  and the efficacy of outcomes. The following  section  discusses  three
sources  of evidence  relating to various sources  of differences  in parental power: the degree of
local control, teacher  unions, and private schools.
Local and parental contributions.  A first source of evidence is the impact of direct
parental participation  and contributions. Modest amounts  of direct contributions  of parents
should  have large effects on performance  only to the extent that some inputs  (infrastructure,
equipment, instructional  materials)  are so dramatically  under-funded  by the publicly allocated
budget  that their marginal products  per dollar are very high.  If marginal products  were
equalized  (even according to an optimizing  model  with multiple outputs)  then the relatively
small contributions  should  only have a proportionately  small effect.  Evidence  of substantial
impact  by parent's groups, or of local control, or of the proportion of resources  from local
sources is itself a sign of a failure to maximize  outputs in the overall system of expenditure
allocation.
Jimenez  and Paqueo (1996)  using data from the Philippines  find that schools  with a
small component  of local financing  (under 5 percent)  are incredibly  less productive  than
29schools with even a small share of public financing: their achievement score per dollar is only
a third as high.  More importantly, the cost savings that produce this greater cost effectiveness
come disproportionately from personnel whose cost per student is 52 percent lower,  with much
smaller cost savings for other inputs (Table 5).
Table 5:  Relative  cost effectiveness  and expenditures  composition  of locally  versus
non-locally  financed  schools
Proportion  of funds  from local sources:
<5%  > 25%  Percentage  difference
Overall  score  42.46  48.25  13.6%
Total expenditures  675  265  -60.7%
Achievement  score  per  0.06  0.18  189.1%
peso
Cost  per student  (Philippi es  pesos)  .
Personnel  469  226  -51.8%
Maintenance  and  42  35  -16.5%
operating  _
Textbooks  1  7  5  -26.6%
Source:  Adapted  from Jimenez  and Paqueo  (1996),  table 1.
Similarly, James, King and Suryadi (1996) find that even controlling for whether
schools are public or private, a greater share of funds that are locally raised compared to
centrally allocated increases significantly educational output (in their model, decreases cost for
a given output) 22.
Many countries have adopted locally run community schools as a mechanism to
accommodate the demand for schooling in remote and rural areas that are not reached by the
22  Both of these papers use econometric estimation of the dual, that is, cost per student
controlling for quality,  rather than estimate a production function.  However, their results on
local financing indicate that the primal problem is not maximization of output subject to a
budget constraint,  but rather some more complicated objective function involving teacher
utility of the type we explore here.
30"official"  school system. One common  feature  of these schools is that the teachers  are hired by
the local community  and are not education  ministry employees  and are not subject  to the usual
qualification  requirements. While there is little direct evaluation  of these schools  that can
compare  costs and outcomes,  the existing  evidence  suggests  that community  managed  schools
user fewer "teacher  wage"  inputs and achieve  essentially  the same or better academic  results.
Results on local financing  and the experience  with community  schools  are consistent
with more centrally controlled  resources  being allocated  by an optimizer  with a high concern
for teacher welfare (high a) principally  to teacher inputs, while locally  raised funds being
subject to a greater degree of parental  control and hence high concern for educational  output
(low a) and are allocated  principally  to non-wage  inputs  with high marginal product.
Private schools. The evidence  from five developing  countries  marshaled  by Jimenez
and Lockheed  (1995) shows  that, even controlling  for selection  effects, private schools are
significantly  more cost effective  than public schools. This fact alone is inconsistent  with the
sirnple  or uncertainty  optimizing  model  of the allocation  of the public budget.  However, it is
possible that the improvement  in efficiency  is due to pure X-inefficiency  of public schools, that
is public and private schools  do not differ in the allocation  of inputs  but simply  that private
schools  are uniformly more productive  for all inputs.  An alternative  explanation,  consistent
with a model of teacher influence,  is that private schools, if they are more subject  to
competition  for enrollments,  are more directly  controlled  by parents. By being more subject to
parental pressure and less susceptible  to teacher power the managers  of private schools (or
private school systems)  will have a lower "a'than public  school system managers  and these
differences  in parental control should  produce  both higher effectiveness  of the budget  overall
31and also different ratios of inputs.  Importantly,  since evidence  from private schools is based
on parental willingness  to pay for schooling  it does not depend  on test scores as the measure,
as it incorporates  parent's concerns about the all schooling  outputs. If the observed  difference
in marginal products  per dollar of inputs were the result of optimizing  over multiple outputs
and public and private schools  were optimizing  over the same set of outputs, then one should
not observe  systematic  differences  across  the marginal  products of various inputs between
private and public schools.
Fortunately  there is a recent study that provides  almost  exactly this test. Alderman,
Orazem and Patemo (1996)  examine how the characteristics  of schools (like instructional
expenditure  per student  and class sizes)  affect parental  decisions  between private and public
schools  in Lahore, Pakistan, an urban area where 58 percent of students  are enrolled in private
schools  even though private school fees are 5 times higher. They find, controlling for class
sizes and instructional  expenditures,  that achievement  scores  were 60 percent higher in private
schools.
Since school  level instructional  expenditure  represents  almost  entirely teacher salaries
we can compare  how much parents  are willing  to pay to increase  salaries  versus decrease  class
sizes. As shown in table 6, parental willingness  to pay to increase  salaries in the private sector
was almost six times larger than in the public sector, suggesting  that the marginal  product of
additional  teacher wages in terms of all parental valued  outputs (not just scores) in the public
sector was already quite low.  Conversely,  class sizes were so high in the public sector that
parents were willing to pay substantial  amounts  to reduce them, and were substantially  more
willing  to pay for class size reductions  than wage increases,  the opposite  of the private sector.
32Table 6:  Parental willingness to pay for teacher salary increases versus class size reductions
in private and public schools in Pakistan.
Private school  Public School  Ratio Private to
public
Expenditures per teacher (rupees per month)  7711  8406  .92
Parental willingness to pay to increase  40.4  7.05  5.7
instructional expenditure per pupil (a proxy for
teacher salaries of Rp 200)
Average class size  25.2  42.5  .59
Parental willingness to pay to decrease class size  -35.7  7.10
by 10 students
Ratio of willingness to pay an additional rupee to  .47
teacher salaries versus class size reductions
Notes: Adapted from tables 2 and 5, using willingness  to pay of parents with monthly household income of Rp.
3000 (Alderman, Ozarem, and Patemo, 1996).
Unions.  Caroline Minter-Hoxby has two recent pieces of research, which although
they are on the US and not developing countries, are relevant to the issue at hand 23. In one
(1994) she shows that the larger the number of school districts within a given metropolitan
area the better the performance of the schools.  She argues this is evidence that greater
competition among public school districts substitutes for school choice and increases
performance.  Another paper (1996) shows that even after controlling for the endogeneity of
unionization,  school districts that are unionized are less effective than the non-union school
districts.  She shows that in districts with unions, spending on schools is higher but a larger
proportion goes to teachers.
23 Since we believe that there are qualitative differences between the US case and that in
developing countries,  we are reluctant to use any evidence at all from the US, as this raises a
whole host of US specific issues.  However, the evidence provided here is too unique and too
directly related to the question at hand to pass up.
33ITT)  Implications of a p2ositive  theory for educational policy
We have shown that the educational output optimizing model of expenditure allocation,
in all its variants is inconsistent with the evidence and that a simple model in which teacher
utility receives direct concern in expenditure choices is consistent with the stylized facts.
Having a positive model of educational spending is important for the analysis of policy
options.  As mentioned in the introduction, there are two kinds of educational policies
currently proposed:  more of the same (higher enrollments, higher expenditures, better teacher
training, etc.) and fundamental reform of incentives (decentralization, community
involvement, school choice, etc.).  Guidance on the choice between these requires modeling
the underlying public sector decision and control mechanisms as fundamental reforms are
about changing the incentives within the sector.
A) More hudget versus reform
As mentioned above, one of the puzzles in the literature on educational production
functions is that it is often difficult to demonstrate a positive impact of increased spending on
educational outcomes 24. The literature is criticized precisely because the results seem so
implausible to educators and educated alike: of course "money matters" and on some level
24  The two best arguments against this are the meta-analysis of studies in the US (Hedges,
Laine and Greenwald,  1994)  and the studies of the impact on subsequent wages of budgetary
resources while in school (Card and Krueger,  1996), also done exclusively in the US.  Both of
these are reasonably convincing that there is some, but small, connection between expenditures
and outcomes, which of course under a positive maximizing model must have been the case.
But neither of these methods speak to the question of whether a different budgetary allocation
could have had a larger impact.
34everyone  knows  that2'.  But the implication  of our positive  model is that while "money
matters"  to educational  outcomes, money  also matters to those who receive it as income  and
that "mattering"  will have implications  for publicly  determined  outcomes,  like the allocation  of
expenditures.
Budgets and educational  outcomes  when objectives  differ. If non-experimental  data are
taken from jurisdictions (or time periods within the same  jurisdiction)  that differ in either the
degree of educational  output concern (1-a) or in the degree of professionalism  (6) of the
teachers  then equal budgets  could produce very unequal outcomes  due to the allocation  across
inputs".  For any given level of a, higher budgets  lead to better outcomes  (the sense in which
money  matters). But a higher a implies worse outcomes  for any given budget. Any
estimation  of the relationship  between expenditures  and budgets  from non-experimental  data
that differ in a which  do not control for these differences  can produce  any relationship  at all:
positive, zero, or negative. For instance,  Hanushek  and Kim (1996) estimate  the relationship
between the internationally  comparable  test scores  of achievement  in math and science  derived
from the various IEA and IEAP studies  and expenditures. They find that both public
expenditure  per student  and the ratio of total educational  expenditure  to GDP are significantly
25  There has been a vociferous  debate in the US around the question  "does money  matter?"
In this political  debate the rejoinder "the only ones who say resources  do not matter have their
children in schools  with adequate  resources"  carries a good deal of common  sense appeal.
26Differences  in the relative weight  of teachers  also happen  over time within a given
jurisdiction as across  jurisdictions. For instance, in Paraguay  after the end of a long period of
dictatorship  teacher wages  more than tripled in a six year period, with an almost complete  lack
of complementary  reforms either in the school system  or even in the structure  of teacher pay.
Given  the total lack of objective  comparable  testing it is impossible  to say for sure, but many
doubt this increase  led to commensurate  increases  in student  performance.
35negatively  related to achievement. While this obviously  cannot represent  the impact  of the
relaxation  of the budget constraint,  if higher a values  are associated  with higher budgets  then
the data across  jurisdictions  on budgets  and outcomes  could show a negative relationship,  as in
figure 2 with a line fitted to hypothetical  outcomes  A, B and C, even though for any given a a
budget increase  would improve scores.




Given that both budgets  and their allocation  matter, what should  be the focus of
improving  school performance? The answer  that wil! be guaranteed  vocal support is "increase
budgets"  as this generates  support  among  parents, the general  public who have an interest in
promoting  better education,  and teachers  (for both professional  and self-interested  reasons).
27  Differences  in misallocation  relative  to the optimum  is only one possible  explanation  of
the empirically  small impacts  of budgets  on outcomes. The other is that educators  are
systematically  ignorant of the true pedagogical  function, and ideological  blinders, not self-
interest prevents them from acknowledging  the truth.  This is essentially  the controversial
argument  E.D. Hirsch (1996)  makes about schooling  in the US.  In this case more resources
do not produce greater output because  of ignorance  about the production function.
36However, if the existing  allocation  of inputs is not optimal, school  performance  can also be
improved  by a reallocation  of expenditures  with no increases  in the overall budget. These
proposals will tend to split the above coalition  and pit educators  against all others.  Which type
of reform will be the most effective  if implemented? The answer  is, not surprisingly  (and
even reassuringly),  it all depends. If the budget  is high and a is high then fundamental
reforms are more pressing. If on the other hand the budget is low and a is low then budgetary
reform should  receive  priority.
To say more, we can make specific  (and very limiting)  assumptions  about the
functional  forms of the production  function and teacher  utility (Cobb-Douglas)  and assume no
teacher professionalism. Under these assumptions  we can solve explicitly  for the relationship
between scores, budgets  and a.  In this case, the score improvement  from budget increases
approaches  infinity as the budget tends  to zero and approaches  zero as the budget tends  to
Figure  3:  Impact  of  budget  reform  versus  changes  in  a
l  8~~S/8u,  BS/8B 
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37infinity for any given a.  The incremental  impact  of changes  in a on scores  approaches  zero as
a goes to zero and approaches  infinity  as it approaches  one 28. As can be seen in figure 3, this
situation  implies that for any given level of the budget, B.  there is a critical level, a*, such
that for all levels of a above a* the increment  to changing  a will have a greater impact than
changing  the budget. Similarly,  for any level of teacher  power, a.,  there is some level of the
budget low enough (B*) such that increasing  the budget will have more impact  on scores  than
changing  teacher  power.
B) Three possible  models  hehind  the model
The model we have specified  is ad hoc, in that it is not derived from underlying
behavior  by actors, and hence is more of a description  of a class of models  that might be
derived from different structural  assumptions. That is, we have not articulated  a complete
model which specifies  which person or entity controls  the allocation  of spending  (a school
board? a legislature?  the ministry of education?)  nor why exactly that person or entity cares
directly  about teacher  welfare. For many of our conclusions  the exact model is not important.
However, to move to the predictions  about outcomes  of more specific  reforms  one needs to
specify  a more complete  model. There are three prototype  models:  principal-agent,  teacher
power, and  patronage, each of which has different  implications  for policy.
28  Both of these results are illustrative  only as they follow quite mechanically  from the
Cobb-Douglas  assumptions,  which implies that each input is 'essential"  in the sense its
marginal product goes to infinity  as the level of input approaches  zero.
38Principal-agent. In this model  the decision  maker can be either the parents themselves
or a manager that faithfully  represents  parent interests. The source of teacher weight  in the
objective  function is superior  knowledge  by teachers  about the production  function. In this
case, teachers  will systematically  misrepresent  the production  function so as to lead the
chooser of budgets  to choose greater spending  on those inputs that teachers  prefer.  In this
model, empirical studies actually  might have some impact  by revealing  the true production
function. This particular  model predicts a systematic  tendency  of educators  to resist
quantitative  evaluation  of their output, as this allows checking  the reported production function
against the actual.
Teacher  power.  The second  possibility  is that teachers  as a group are powerful enough
to affect the allocation  of education  expenditures. In this case, there is a third party (e.g.
minister of education)  or institution  (e.g. legislature  or school  board) that controls budgetary
allocations  and has to choose  between  pleasing a concentrated  group of educators  and a diffuse
group of parents.  Given that on issues like teacher  wages educators  have a very clear and
direct interest, they may be more successful  at organizing  to influence  public  decisions  than
are parents. In this case, the problem is not that parents are systematically  under informed
about the production  function, but that parents have greater difficulty  overcoming  the free
rider problem inherent in collective  action than do teachers  (Olson, 1965).
In our model greater teacher  professionalism  helps output. However, the mechanisms
that foster greater teacher  professionalism  are precisely  those  that tend to create greater teacher
power by making cooperation  in lobbying  easier.  A common  recommendation  of education
39professionals  is to get teachers  to work together, to share  experience,  give support, etc.
However, teachers  are no different  than any other group and Adam  Smith's adage applies 29.
Patronage.  Another  possible  model  is that teachers  are not particularly  powerful  but
the chooser of expenditures  is powerful. Suppose  that the Minister of Education  can allocate
all jobs and each  job creates a favor.  In this case the chooser  would  want teacher salaries to be
relatively  low (but a slight  premium so that the job is a "favor")  but would want to maximize
the employment  of teachers. In this case teachers  would  be poorly paid individually  but there
would far too many teachers. This might explain those  cases in which the marginal product of
teacher  salary was greater than that of class size as the total wage  bill to the chooser is more
important  than the wage.
C) The analytical  base for fundamental school reforms
A positive model of educational  expenditures  will also provide guidance  to the actions
or reforms that are likely to improve  outcomes. In particular, there are three commonly
proposed  actions  that are unlikely  to lead to significant  changes  in performance: more research
into the technical  pedagogical  processes  behind  the production  function, more school choice
without  true competition,  and greater parental  involvement  without control or choice.
Ignorance  or incentives? Even though, as in all fields that involve  human  behavior,
there are enormous areas of ignorance,  the fundamental  problem is typically  not teacher  or
29  "People  of the same trade seldom  meet together, even for merriment and diversion,  but
the conversation  ends in a conspiracy  against  the public, or in some  contrivance  to raise
prices.
40technocrat ignorance  that could be resolved  by more research. Our positive model implies
several things about education  research. First, since  some types of research are inimical  to
furthering  certain interests  this implies that one should  expect there to be relatively  little
research into cost effectiveness  of various  inputs from educational  production  functions. The
amount of ignorance  is endogenous,  and sometimes  it pays to be ignorant 30. Second,  only well
disseminated  and widely  understood  studies  that foment deep  public dissatisfaction  with the
schools  would be likely to change  the incentives  of the actors within the system and hence have
any influence  on outcomes. Merely documenting  the differences,  as has been done in many
times and many places, will typically  have  no effect.
Finally, an implication  similar to the lack of new studies  in influencing  expenditure
allocations  is that educational  innovations  that are labor saving  will be under adopted.  That
is, when technological  advance  shifts  the production  function  such that more of some other
input and less of teaching  input is now optimal, one can expect to see resistance and see that
the adoption  rate is very slow, or occurs without  any labor saving 3".  In almost complete
30  This point is not lost on legislators  or policy  makers. In Horn's (1995) terminology  the
"enacting  coalition"  of interests have incentives  to prevent future legislators  or policy  makers
from undoing their agreement. In the US for instance, certain  types of regulatory  legislation
explicitly forbid the implementing  agency  from considering  costs. During certain periods
Department  of Agriculture  economists  were forbidden  from doing any research on the
economic  losses from existing agricultural  policies. A recent example  is the Clinton
administration's  refusal  to redo a study of the impact  of welfare  reform which had been
influential  in scuttling  earlier legislation  (The  Washinton  Post, July 26, 1996).
31  Again, teachers  are not alone in this as capital intensive  innovations  have always
brought resistance  from those  with specific  human  capital. In fairness, labor intensive
innovations  have also met staunch  resistance,  such as the persistent  opposition  to land reform
from large land owners  in Latin America (Binswanger  et al, 1993).
41ignorance,  we would  predict very slow and patchy adoption  of innovations  like rural radio
based instruction,  shown almost  twenty  years ago to be extraordinarily  cost effective
(Lockheed  and Hnaushek, 1988), even when this technology  is appropriate.  Even more
speculatively,  we guess new technologies  will only make headway as an input in addition to
teacher inputs and hence will be adopted only when the new technology  is used as an output
(and budget increasing)  device, and not for cost savings.
School  choice with and without  competition. Since  teacher welfare increases  directly
with their weight in the decision  maker's objectives,  teachers  as a group will rightly oppose
any reform efforts that would reduce  that power. Changes  that provide more school  choice to
satisfy "taste  heterogeneity"  but that do not create true supply  competition  on input use will be
unlikely to change  input expenditure  outcomes  significantly. This is clearly consistent  with
teacher's opposition  to private school choice and their lesser concern with choice entirely
within a controlled  public sector.
Exceptions  to the widespread  predominance  of public schools  perhaps prove the rule.
In some school systems,  such as those in the Netherlands  and Argentina, "private"  schools are
subsidized  by direct government  payments  and private schools  account  for a large fraction of
enrollment. However, these payments  in Argentina  are structured  such that it creates no
incentive  at all for the private schools  to economize  on teaching inputs. First, the teacher's
union covers both private and public  teachers  and private schools  hire only union teachers.
Second,  the government  subsidy  is not a per student  payment  that can be used for any input
but rather goes directly to pay the wages  of teachers.  A simple  model of teacher  power would
predict that a teacher  input subsidy  to private schools is the political  outcome  in the situation
42where teachers  are powerful and parents  demand  school heterogeneity  (on "taste"  grounds,
such as ideological  or religious)  as this allows schools  to compete  in parental tastes without
jeopardizing teacher's welfare by competing  in costs or input mix (James, 1987).
Decentralization/localization/parental  participation. In implicit  recognition  of the
incentive  problems  inherent  in centrally  controlled  public provision  of schooling  there have
been a number of moves  to increase  local control over schools. These range from
"decentralization"  type reforms which shift the governmental  authority  with control over the
provision  of schooling, from federal to state (provincial),  or state (provincial)  to municipal, to
"localization"  or "school  autonomy"  initiatives  to move more control over schools from
whatever  level to the schools  themselves.
Within the context of our model  the impact  of jurisdictional  decentralization  on average
performance  depends  entirely  on how much it alters power between educators  and parents.
First, merely moving from federal  to state control seems  unlikely to change  much as moving
to a quite low level would seem to be necessary  to bring about real shifts in relative strengths.
Second, much depends  on how and how well teachers  are organized. If teachers  are organized
effectively  at a geographic  level higher than that of the school  administration  (e.g. national
unions versus local school  boards) then some  of the most crucial  decisions  (e.g. level and
structure  of teacher  wages, class sizes, work conditions)  may be outside  the scope of control of
the local school  authorities.
The impact  of school "localization"  or direct parental  participation  will depend to a
large extent on the degree to which  this shift fundamentally  changes  the balance  between
teacher and parent interests.  Most decentralizations  are of the type in which  parent groups  are
43given specific  responsibilities  (like mobilizing  additional  expenditures)  but do not have
managerial  control, particularly  over monitoring  teachers, teacher  hiring and firing, teacher
wages, etc.  This is the level of decentralization  most often observed, perhaps  precisely
because teachers  resist coming  under the authority  of parents, either in instruction  which is
naturally thought  to be their professional  prerogative,  but also in wages  and work conditions,
where they would  prefer to negotiate  a centrally  bargained  solution. In this case one would
expect the experience  of decentralization  to have mixed results, as it will have some, but
modest, impacts  on school  performance.
There is another  kind of reform sometimes  called "decentralization"  which is more
about the autonomy  of the individual  school from a larger administrative  or political unit.
Some versions even propose "teacher  autonomy"  implying  a greater control of individual
teachers  over classroom  practices  and instructional  method. Here it is obvious that "control"
over different aspects  of the overall educational  process are being discussed. Suggesting  that
individuals  should  be able to choose their own health care provider to increase  patient power to
discipline  suppling  health markets does not imply a loss of professional  autonomy  of surgeons
over what happens  on the operating  room.  In fact, in an environment  with greater consumer
power, institutions  which provide  greater autonomy  at the organizational  (e.g. school,
hospital)  and professional  (e.g. doctor, teacher)  level may do even better than institutions  with
centralized  controlling  bureaucracies.  Greater parental  power might not increase  or decrease
teacher and school power, but rather change its dimensions.
44Conclsion
Even though it is shockingly  simplistic,  there are enormous  advantages  to thinking
through  the implications  of positive  models of the allocation  of expenditures. In particular,
these models  have strong implications  for the expected  results from the estimation  of an
educational  production  function: in any optimizing  model marginal  product  per dollar of all
inputs in increasing  the value of output should  be equalized  at the point chosen. However, no
study that we know of ever  tested that hypothesis  and did not reject it.  Nearly every study
finds that the "cost  effectiveness"  of educational  inputs  differs by almost an order of
magnitude, or more.  These results are too strong  and the pattern of the relative cost-
effectiveness  among  inputs too consistent  to be happenstance. Spending  on educational  inputs
is systematically  affected  by how much weight  teacher  related  inputs have in determining  the
allocation  of spending  across inputs, independent  of their impact  on outputs.
Given the evidence,  we think the correct model that describes  the actual allocation  of
educational  expenditures  must include  the fact that educators  have enormous  influence  over the
allocation  of spending  and that spending  is biased towards  those educational  inputs that also
directly increase  the welfare of teachers. Crudely  put, teachers  lobby (and form unions, and
strike, and write) and books and desks do not.  Parents generally  have been insufficiently
strong on  behalf of books.  This implies that the main role of the estimation  of educational
production  functions  is not to inform an optimizing  policy  maker of the "true"  technical
production function  but rather to provide the information  necessary  to encourage  deeper
educational  reforms  that change  the structure  of decision making  power.
45Ribliography
Alderman, Harold, Peter Orazem,  and Elizabeth  Paterno, 1996. "School  Quality, School
Cost, and the Public/Private  School Choices  of Low-Income  Households  in Pakistan."
Impact Evaluation  of Education  Reform  Working  Paper Series No. 2 PRDPH.  The
World Bank. Washington,  DC.
Binswanger,  Hans P., Klaus Deininger, and Gershon  Feder, 1993, "Power, distortions, revolt
and reform in agricultural  land relations,"  World Bank, Policy Research  Working
Paper Series, No. 1164.
Card, David and Alan Krueger, 1996. "School  Resources  and Student  Outcomes:  An
Overview  of the Literature and New Evidence  from North and South Carolina. Journal
of Economic Perspectives. 10:31-50.
Carnoy, and Welmond, 1996,  "Do teachers  get paid too much? A worldwide  comparison  of
teacher  pay," mimeo, Stanford  University.
Cox-Edwards,  Alejandra, 1989, "Understanding  differences  in wages  relative to income per
capita: the case of teachers' salaries,"  Economics  of Education  Review, 8(2):  197-203.
Fuller, Bruce, 1986. "Raising  School  Quality in Developing  Countries: What Investments
Boost Learning?" World Bank Discussion  Paper No. 76. Washington,  DC.
Fuller, Bruce and Prema Clarke, 1994. "Raising  School Effects  While Ignoring Culture?
Local Conditions  and the Influence  of Classroom  Tools, Rules, and Pedagogy,"
Review of Educational Research, 64(1):119-157.
Glewwe,  Paul, 1996, "The  Economics  of School  Quality  Investments  in Developing  Countries:
An Empirical Study of Ghana,"  Mimeo. PRDPH.  The World Bank. Washington,
DC.
Hanushek, Eric A.,  1995, "Interpreting  Recent Research  on Schooling  in Developing
Countries,"  World Bank Research Observer, 10(2):227-246.
Hanushek, Eric A. and Victor Lavy, 1994, "School  quality, achievement  bias, and dropout
behavior in Egypt,"  LSMS Working  Paper No. 107. The World Bank. Washington,
DC.
Hanushek, Eric A. and Dongwook  Kim, 1996, "Schooling,  Labor Force Quality and the
growth of Nations,"  mimeo, University  of Rochester.
46Harbison, Ralph and Eric A. Hanushek, 1992, Educational  Performance  of the Poor: Lessons
from Northeast  Brazil, Washington  DC: Oxford  for the World Bank.
Hedges, Larry, Richard D. Laine, and Rob Greenwald, 1994, "Does  money  matter? A meta-
analysis of studies of the effects  of differential  school inputs  on student  outcomes,"
Educational  Researcher,  23(3):5-14.
Hirsch, E.D.,  1996. The schools  we need and why we don't have them. New York:
Doubleday.
Horn, Murray, 1995, The Political  Economy  of Public  Administration:  Institutional  Choice  in
the Public Sector, Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press.
Inter-American  Development  Bank, 1996, Economic  and Social  Progress  in Latin America
with Special Section,  Making Social  Services Work,  Washington  DC:  Johns Hopkins
University  Press for IADB.
James, Estelle, 1987, "Public  private division of responsibility  for education:  an international
comparison"  Economics  of Education  Review  6(1):  1-14
James, Estelle, Elizabeth  King, and Ace Suryadi, 1996. "Finance,  Management,  and Costs of
Public and Private Schools  in Indonesia,"  Economics  of Education  Review, 15(4):387-
398.
Jimenez, Emmanuel, 1986, "Structure  of educational  costs: multiproduct  cost functions  for
primary and secondary  schools  in Latin America,"  Economics  of Education  Review, vol
5, No. 1:25-39.
Jimenez, Emmanuel  and Marlaine  E. Lockheed.  1995. "Public  and Private Secondary
Education  in Developing  Countries". Discussion  Paper No. 309.  The World Bank.
Washington,  D.C.
Jimenez, Emmanuel  and Vicente  Paqueo, 1996, "Do local contributions  affect the efficiency  of
public primary schools?" Economics  of Education  Review, vol 15(4):377-386.
Khandker, Shahidur  R., Victor Lavy and Deon Filmer, 1994, "Schooling  and Cognitive
Achievements  in Morocco:  Can the Government  Improve Outcomes".  Discussion
Paper No. 264. The World Bank.  Washington,  D.C.
Kingdon, Geeta Ghandi, 1996. "Student  Achievement  and Teacher Pay: A Case-Study  in
India," DEP No. 74. STICERD,  London  School  of Economics.  London.
47Knight, Frank, 1921 (1985), Risk, uncertainty  and profit, Chicago: University  of Chicago
Press.
Lockheed,  Marlaine and Eric Hanushek, 1988, 'Improving educational  efficiency in
developing  countries: What do we Know," Compare, 18(1).
Minter-Hoxby,  Caroline, 1994, "Does  competition  among  public schools benefit students  and
taxpayers?"  NBER Working  Paper Series No. 4979.
Minter-Hoxby,  Caroline, 1996. "How  Teachers' Unions  Affect Education  Production,"
Quarterly  Journal  of Economics. 111:671-718
Olson, Mancur, 1965, The  Logic of Collective  Action: Public Goods  and the Theory  of
Groups, Cambridge:  Harvard University  Press.
Piccioto, Robert, 1996. "What  is Education  Worth? From Production  Function to
Institutional  Capital," HCD Working  Paper No. 75. The World Bank. Washington,
DC.
Pigou, A.C.,  1912.  Wealth and Welfare. London: Macmillan  and Co.
Psacharopoulos,  George, 1987. 'Are teachers  overpaid?: some evidence  from Brazil,"
EDT Report  No.95. The World Bank. Washington,  DC.
Tan, Jee-Peng, Julia Lane, Paul Coustere, 1996, "Putting  inputs to work in elementary
schools: What can be done in the Philippines?" Mimeo, World Bank.
Velez, Eduardo, Emesto Schiefelbein,  and Jorge Valenzuela,  1993. "Factors  Affecting
Achievement  in Primary Education,"  HRO Working Paper No. 2.  The World Bank.
Washington,  DC.
World Bank, 1995, Priorities  and Strategies  for Education,  Washington  DC: World Bank.
World Bank, 1996a. India: Primary  Education  Achievement  and Challenges. Report No.
15756-IN.  Washington, DC.
World Bank, 1996b. Philippines:  Education  Financing  and Social  Equity:  A Reform Agenda.
Report No.  15898-PH.  Washington, DC.
48Appendix 1: Two other reviews of the literature.
Table A.1:  Confirmation  ratios of the significance  of various inputs sorted by direct impact on
educator welfare from 96 studies in developing  countries
Number  of  Positive  Negative  Confirnation
Input  studies  (significant)  (significant)  Insignificant  Percentage
Teacher's  salary  13  4  2  7  30.8
School  teacher-pupil  ratio  30  8  8  14  26.7
Teacher's  education  63  35  2  26  55.6
Teacher's  experience  46  16  2  28  34.8
School  facilities  34  22  3  9  64.7
Source:  Harbison  and Hanushek,  1992.
Table A.2:  Confirmation ratios of the significance  of various educational inputs sorted by their
direct  utility  to educators,  from  studies  in Latin  America.
Number  of  Positive  Negative  Confirmation
Characteristic  studies  relation  relation  No relation  Percentage
Teacher's  satisfaction  43  4  2  37  9.3
School  student/teacher  ratio  21  2  9  10  9.5
Teacher's  years of schooling  68  31  4  33  45.6
Teacher's  years of experience  62  25  2  35  40.3
Teacher's  subject  knowledge  19  9  1  9  47.4
School  infrastructure  70  23  2  45  32.9
Access  to textbooks  and other  reading
materials  17  13  0  4  76.5
School  access  to other  instructional
materials  34  14  3  17  41.2
Source:  Velez,  Scheifilbein,  and  Valenzuela,  1993.
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